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ENDING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE DEBATE
Alan Calnan*
I. INTRODUCrION
Tort reform is one of this country's most hotly debated topics. It is
a broad movement bent on altering or at least reconsidering a wide
variety of familiar legal doctrines, ranging from joint liability to the
rule requiring litigants to pay their own attorney's fees. Of all the
subjects encompassed within this debate, however, few have attracted
as much interest or concern as the concept of punitive damages.
Punitive damages are a sum of money that wrongdoers must pay to
civil claimants as a penalty for engaging in certain forms of socially
reprehensible conduct.1 Although this remedy has enjoyed a long his-
tory in American law, its future recently has been cast into doubt.
Many experts have argued that such relief should be made more diffi-
cult to obtain.2 Others have advised giving judges, instead of juries,
the exclusive authority to mete out this penalty.3 Still others have rec-
ommended placing severe restrictions upon the amount of money that
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles, California. My
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1. See 35A WORDS AND PHRASES 182-85 (1963) (citations omitted) (presenting various defini-
tions of "punitive damages").
2. See AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, PUNTrIvE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCrIvE EXAMINATION
3-4 (1986) (suggesting the use of a clear and convincing evidence standard for awarding punitive
damages); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Proce-
dures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 351 (1983) (arguing that civil defendants who are subject to punitive
damages should be afforded the same Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment procedural protec-
tions as criminal defendants),
3. See Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 96 (1985-86) (arguing that judges would be more
sensitive to the economic and social aspects of punitive damages in products liability cases); Jane
Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
639, 664 (1980) (arguing that judges should assess punitive damages because most jurors lack the
experience and expertise for such an assessment); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Puni-
tive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 52 (1982) (stat-
ing that trial judges should determine the amount of punitive damages because jurors may be
unduly influenced by the defendant's wealth).
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may be recovered. 4 A few have even urged that this remedy be elimi-
nated entirely.5
Sensing the growing dissatisfaction with punitive damages,
lawmakers within the last few years have launched an all-out legisla-
tive attack upon this peculiar American legal institution. For instance,
many states already have placed strict caps on the size of punitive
judgments that may be awarded in certain types of cases.6 Alterna-
tively, several jurisdictions deny any amount of punitive relief unless
the plaintiff can establish the defendant's misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence. 7 At the federal level, Congress currently is con-
sidering a bill that would limit substantially the recovery of punitive
damages in all lawsuits involving product-related injuries.8
By and large, such reforms have been initiated and supported by
political conservatives, business interests and health care practition-
ers.9 These reformers contend that, because courts seldom provide
any meaningful guidelines for assessing punitive damages, juries com-
4. See Owen, supra note 3, at 48-49 n.227 (recommending that a ceiling be placed on the
amount of punitive damages that may be recovered against a defendant for a single act or omis-
sion); Tom Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAcaK L. REV. 195,
252 (1978) ("Congress could limit a punitive damage award in a single mass disaster case to the
lesser of a fixed amount or a percentage of net worth.").
5. See L. S. Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Out-
line, 11 F. 57 (1975) (arguing that punitive damages should not be awarded when they will be
paid from a collateral source); James E. Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be
Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 8
(Donald J. Hirsch & James G. Pouros eds., 1969) (arguing that the doctrine of punitive damages
should "be removed from modem tort law as quickly as possible").
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20(4), 6-11-21 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (placing a $250,000 cap on
punitive damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (1994) (placing a $250,000 cap on all but product
liability cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994) (providing a complex capping formula). In
all, twelve states place some form of cap on the amount of punitive damages that a plaintiff may
recover. See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, 81 A.B.A. J. 56, 59 (providing a chart
summarizing approaches of all fifty states); see also Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Dam-
ages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8
n.25 (1992) (citing statutes of eight states).
7. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1987) (requiring a "preponderance of clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence" for the award of punitive damages); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2)
(1992) (establishing a clear and convincing evidence standard); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80
(Anderson 1995) (indicating that punitive damage awards must be supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence).
This heightened evidentiary standard is rapidly becoming the majority approach. See Middle-
ton, supra note 6, at 59 (providing a chart showing that since 1986 seventeen states have adopted
the "clear and convincing" standard of evidence); Rustad, supra note 6, at 7-8 n.24 (providing a
chart demonstrating that twenty-seven states in the last ten years have adopted either a "clear
and convincing" or "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for proving punitive damages).
8. See The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (pro-
posing a cap on punitive damages at the lesser of $250,000 or twice the amount of compensatory
damages).
9. A majority of the senators who proposed Senate Bill 565 are Republicans. Id.
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monly render enormous retributive verdicts on the basis of sympathy
and nothing more.10 The effect of such unpredictable and often finan-
cially devastating liability, they assert, is that many valuable enter-
prises are forced to raise the prices of their goods or services or, in
some cases, to go out of business altogether.1
The opponents of punitive damage reform consist primarily of polit-
ical liberals, trial lawyers and consumer advocates.' 2 These antago-
nists argue that punitive damages perform a couple of important
social functions. The most obvious purpose of this civil remedy is to
punish specific wrongdoers for engaging in past conduct which is
either malicious, oppressive or fraudulent. 13 Its more critical function,
however, is to deter potential wrongdoers, usually "deep pocket" cor-
porate defendants, from committing such acts in the future. 14 The
feeling is that without the monetary sting that punitive damages in-
flict, corporate wrongdoers would maximize their profits at the ex-
pense of the health and safety of an unsuspecting public.
Both sides of the debate have evidence to support their respective
positions. The reformers are able to point to a number of horror
stories which illustrate how costly punitive damages can be: like the
10. See Duffy, supra note 5 at 8 (stating that while generally punitive damages must bear some
reasonable proportion to actual damages, it appears that juries do not adhere to this instruction);
John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 885 (1976)
("[W]ith no meaningful standard available for assessing punitive damages, the size of the award
is limited only by the passions and prejudices of the jury and the judicial philosophy of the
judges.").
11. See E. PATRICK MCQUIRE, ThE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 1-18 (1988) (assessing the
impact of product liability awards on companies' costs and production of new products); see also
PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: TE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEOUENCES 132 (1988) (not-
ing that society ultimately bears the cost of punitive damages as the companies against which
punitive awards are assessed distribute the cost of such damages by increasing the price of goods
and transportation).
12. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform - State
Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Halsif, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1370-72 (1993) (discussing the political battle in punitive
damage reform).
13. See David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 112
(1982) ("[C]ivil punishment (in some amount proportioned to the wrong) appears to accord with
the fair expectations of the group on the limits of the use of the power and resources of its
members and the consequences of gross abuse.").
14. See Lisa M. Browman, Comment, Punitive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 NEB.
L. REV. 651, 653 (1982) (discussing the purpose of deterrence in punitive damages). See gener-
ally Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies,
40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1989) (recommending that punitive damages be measured by the deterrent
effect necessary and suggesting limits for such a remedy); Jason Johnston, Punitive Liability: A
New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (1987) (setting forth an eco-
nomic theory of punitive liability to be applied to corporations engaged in potentially harmful
activity).
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vaccine manufacturer that complied with all applicable FDA regula-
tions only to be slapped with an eight million dollar punitive judg-
ment,15 or the developer of an innovative new kidney dialysis machine
that discontinued the project for fear of incurring the wrath of an un-
sympathetic jury.16 The antagonists, on the other hand, cite a number
of recent studies - including one released by the United States Jus-
tice Department just months ago - which indicate that retributive
awards in civil cases actually are quite rare and that they seldom ex-
ceed $50,000.17
So how can this debate be amicably resolved? The fact is it needn't
be, at least not as it is presently conceived. Both sides of the debate, it
turns out, have missed the real issue. The question is not whether
punitive damages are arbitrarily or abusively administered, but
whether there is some convincing justification for them in the first
place. This more profound question cannot be answered merely by
examining the size of jury verdicts or the change in people's behavior.
Rather, it requires that the very foundations and objectives of the pu-
nitive damages doctrine be closely reevaluated. That is the aim of this
Essay. Part II begins this inquiry by tracing the evolution of punitive
damages from ancient times to the present. Part III then lays bare the
doctrine's conceptual weaknesses and analyzes its eroding historical
underpinnings. The Essay concludes, in Part IV, by advocating a
number of restorative remedies which would repair dignitary injuries
better than punitive damages ever could.
II. THE HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Ancient Remedies
Punitive remedies were not uncommon in many ancient civiliza-
tions. Selected laws in Babylon, Egypt, Greece and Rome imposed
upon wrongdoers monetary fines in excess of the actual damage they
15. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MrN. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1990) (citing Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial:
Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 Sci. 1395, 1396 (1989)).
16. Id. at 20 n.83 (citing Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial:
Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 Sci. 1395, 1397 (1989)).
17. See id. at 64 (discussing several studies and concluding that "[a]ny changes in the punitive
damages system are likely to be based on an unfounded... notion of crisis and a fundamental
misunderstanding of the problem, the dynamics of the system, and the pattern of change"); Rus-
tad, supra note 6, at 23 (discussing several recent studies and stating that, "[e]very empirical
study of punitive damages awards concludes that there is simply no evidence that punitive dam-
ages are routinely awarded"); see also Punitive Awards Rare in Civil Suits, Study Says, L.A.
TiMES, July 17, 1995, at All.
[Vol. 45:101
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inflicted upon others. 18 Similar provisions were found in the Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., the Hittite Law in 1400 B.C. and the Hindu
Code of Manu in 200 B.C.19 Even the Bible endorses punitive dam-
ages in certain circumstances. Specifically, the book of Exodus pro-
vides that "[i]f a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it,
he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. 20
None of these early legal systems, however, made any attempt to
distinguish civil from criminal penalties. In contrast to our justice sys-
tem, where a wrongdoer may be both criminally prosecuted by the
state and sued by a private party in a civil lawsuit, these primitive
codes provided only one sanction. 21 This sanction was the sole form
of social control available to the ruler or ruling class.22 It discouraged
victims or their families from committing private acts of vengeance
which might create civil unrest. In most modern justice systems, in-
cluding our own, this function is served by the criminal justice system
by imprisoning or fining wrongdoers and awarding restitution to their
victims. Thus, the retributive aspect of ancient codes was more akin
to what we now call criminal law. The modern concept of civil, puni-
tive damages was simply unknown to the ancients.
B. The English Experience
1. Medieval Origins
Early on, English courts imposed punitive sanctions for the same
reasons as their hoary counterparts. Beginning with the Norman In-
vasion in 1066 A.D., law in Great Britain was used primarily as a
means of controlling a potentially hostile populace.23 There was no
tort law per se; instead, most disputes were handled by local courts on
a case-by-case basis.24 Infractions serious enough to breach the peace
were heard by the King's courts.25 Originally, only direct, affirmative
misdeeds would land the perpetrator before a royal justice.26 Later,
18. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PutrnvE DAMAGES §§ 1.1, 1.2 (2d ed.
1989).
19. Id. § 1.1.
20. Exodus 22:1 (emphasis added).
21. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 18, § 1.2 (explaining that while damages in excess
of the harm caused were allowed, multiple sanctions were not).
22. Id.
23. See THEODORE F. T. PLUNCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 15-16 (5th
ed. 1956) (discussing English law after the Norman Conquest).
24. See id. at 79-105 (discussing three types of courts found in early England: communal
courts, seignorial courts and royal courts).
25. Id. at 80-81.
26. Id. at 465-67 (explaining that trespass was originally limited to cases involving deliberate
acts).
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however, even omissions fell within the jurisdiction of the common
pleas courts.2 7 Such suits were initiated when the claimant obtained a
writ of trespass (or trespass on the case for omissions) requesting re-
lief from the alleged wrongdoer. 28 If the allegations of the complaint
were supported by sufficient evidence, the court would require the
defendant to compensate the victim for the loss sustained in their en-
counter. This, however, was not the end of the defendant's troubles.
He also could be thrown in prison for disturbing the tranquility of the
realm.29 If this occurred, he might languish there indefinitely unless
he paid to the crown a punitive fine to buy his release.30
2. Coming of Age
Punitive damages did not appear in English law as a separate civil
remedy until the eighteenth century. 31 By this time, the English jus-
tice system had developed separate criminal and civil sanctions for
intentional misconduct.3 2 In civil cases, juries traditionally consisted
of townspeople who possessed knowledge or information concerning
the matter in dispute.3 3 Often some or all of the jurors may have wit-
nessed the event or transaction which brought the parties to conflict.3
4
As a result, English courts routinely granted civil juries broad discre-
tion in determining the amount of damages awarded to an injured
plaintiff. 3 5 These verdicts were seldom reviewed and almost never
overturned by another court.36
As the medieval feudal system declined, the characteristics of the
English jury system changed.37 Instead of using biased and interested
witnesses to resolve disputes, courts recruited jurors who were de-
27. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359,
363-65 (1951) (finding liability for trespass without any showing of "trespassory conduct").
28. Id. at 361-62.
29. Richard L. Marcus, English Common Law: Studies in the Sources: The Tudor Treason
Trials: Some Observations on the Emergence of Forensic Themes, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 692
(expressing the importance of the "tranquility of the realm").
30. See George E. Woodbine, The Origin of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799, 805-06
(1923) (explaining that the duty of the justices was "not only to administer the law, but also to
increase the royal revenue"; consequently, litigants were required to pay fines to the king). Id.
31. Deborah Travis, Broker Churning: Who is Punished? Vicariously Assessed Punitive Dam-
ages in the Context of Brokerage Houses and Their Agents, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1775, 1791 (1993).
32. See Woodbine, supra note 30, at 803 (stating that England had developed both criminal
and civil actions as early as the thirteenth century).
33. 1 JAMES D. GMARDI & JoHN J. KIRCHER, PUNMVE DAMAGES: LAW & PI~crIcE § 1.02
(1981).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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tached and neutral fact finders.38 Juries no longer possessed actual
knowledge of the parties or events being litigated, but merely ob-
served evidence offered by others. Thus, courts soon felt more com-
fortable second-guessing the juries' verdicts.39
By the 1700s, it was not uncommon for juries, in certain types of
cases, to award greater compensation than was necessary to repair the
plaintiffs' physical injuries.40 Although these cases varied considera-
bly, they seemed to fall into four thematic categories: 1) those involv-
ing private acts of violence (e.g., assault and battery);41 2) those
involving acts of dishonor (e.g., seduction, defamation or breach of a
promise to marry);42 3) those involving abuses of governmental power
(e.g., illegal searches and seizures);43 and 4) those involving corporate
malfeasance (limited almost exclusively to railroad companies). 44 At
the core of all these cases, however, was a clear unifying feature.
Each entailed some sort of egregious misconduct by the defendant on
one hand, and a loss of dignity by the plaintiff on the other.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Towle v. Blake, 48 N.H. 92, 96 (1868) (approving the lower court's award of punitive
damages against a defendant for his tortious acts of violence); Benson v. Frede rick, 97 Eng. Rep.
1130, 1130 (K.B. 1776) (awarding punitive damages to a man who was wrongly stripped and
given twenty lashes); Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (K.B. 1764) (explaining that, "when a
blow is given by one gentleman to another, a challenge and death may ensue, and therefore the
jury have done right in giving exemplary damages").
42. See Knight v. Foster, 39 N.H. 576, 582 (1859) (characterizing a slander case as one of
actual malice and therefore granting exemplary damages); Severance v. Hilton, 32 N.H. 289, 291
(1855) (affirming punitive damages for slander); Davidson v. Goodall, 18 N.H. 423, 430-31
(1846) (awarding excessive damages for seduction); Greenleaf v. McColley, 14 N.H. 303, 306
(1843) (punishing the defendant with punitive damages for breach of promise to marry); Chesley
v. Chesley, 10 N.H. 327, 328 (1839) (awarding punitive damages for a breach of a promise to
marry).
43. See Breadmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792-93 (K.B. 1764) (awarding excessive
damages for the execution of illegal warrant); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B.
1763) (awarding excessive damages for entering a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant);
Wilkes v. Wood, 95 Eng. Rep. 767, 767 (K.B. 1763) (awarding excessive damages again for an
illegal search warrant).
44. See Belknap v. Boston & Me. R.R., 49 N.H. 358, 359 (1870) (asserting an action for assault
against railroad employee for ejecting passenger from defendant's railroad car); Hopkins v. At-
lantic & Saint Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 9, 9-10 (1857) (asserting that an injured plaintiff has an
action against a railroad for damages caused by the railroad's negligent, careless and unskilled
management of its trains); Varillat v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 88, 88-89
(allowing suit for damages for injury sustained in a collision due to carelessness of a railroad
employee).
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3. Conceptual Crisis
Still reluctant to intrude upon the province of the jury, courts re-
viewing these verdicts faced a serious dilemma: How could they ex-
plain or justify damage awards which seemed to exceed the monetary
losses of the plaintiffs? Two different lines of reasoning soon
developed. 45
One view maintained that the additional damages could not be used
by the jury to alleviate the plaintiff's financial injuries, but only to
make an example of the defendant.46 By holding the defendant liable
for such extra-compensatory relief, some courts believed, both the de-
fendant and others would be deterred from engaging in the same type
of misconduct in the future.47 With this innovation, the contemporary
concept of civil, punitive damages was born.
The other justification for permitting inflated damage awards found
no basis in punishment or deterrence. 48 Instead, it was premised on
the long-recognized ground of compensation. 49 Not the traditional
form of compensation allowed for tangible, physical losses, but a dif-
ferent type of recompense for the embarrassment, humiliation or
mental anguish sustained by the victim.50
D. American Reception
These divergent approaches to excessive verdicts were quickly
transplanted into the rapidly emerging body of American law. In
1791, a New Jersey court was the first in the new republic to recognize
45. Courts often failed to clearly state their grounds for affirming the juries' excessive ver-
dicts. This ambiguity gave rise to an interpretational debate between two of the nineteenth
century's most noted legal scholars. Theodore Sedgwick, a Jacksonian intellectual, interpreted
these decisions as recognizing a purely punitive remedy. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREA-
TISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 38-46 (Arno Press 1972) (1847). The conservative whig,
Simon Greenleaf, on the other hand, believed that these cases merely provided compensation
for dignitary injuries. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 (4th
ed. 1848).
46. See SEDOWICK, supra note 45, at 38-39 (stating that where the defendant engaged in fraud,
malice, gross negligence or oppressive behavior "instead of adhering to the system or even the
language of compensation ... [the law] permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindic-
tive, or exemplory damages . . . not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the
offender.")
47. See id. at 39-44 (citations omitted) (discussing several English cases in which the court
imposed punitive damages).
48. See GREENLEAF, supra note 45, § 253 n.2 (arguing that Sedgwick's view was unsupported
by any express decision on point and contradicted the settled legal principles of the time).
49. See id. § 254 (asserting that "[a]ll damages must be the result of the injury complained
of").
50. See id. § 253 n.2 (explaining that the grounds of limitation include injury to plaintiffs'
character and feelings).
1995] ENDING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE DEBATE 109
the doctrine of punitive damages.5 1 This remedy continued to grow in
acceptance among American courts until 1851, when the United
States Supreme Court declared it "a well established principle of the
common law."152
Still, punitive damages were not uniformly adopted in every state.
Several states, in fact, expressly rejected the notion of punitive relief
in civil cases.53  In these jurisdictions, "additional" or "excessive"
damages could be assessed against malevolent wrongdoers only to
compensate for the indignities inflicted upon their victims.5 4 A
number of states, including Michigan, 55 New Hampshire 56 and Wash-
ington,5 7 continue to adhere to this position.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES DECONSTRUCTED
Admittedly, there is a superficial appeal to both the punitive and
compensatory justifications for permitting "additional" damages in
cases involving abhorrent antisocial behavior. After all, forcing bad
guys to pay huge civil penalties seems like a good way of getting their
attention. And giving a little extra compensation to those that have
been severely maltreated or debased does not appear particularly un-
just. Yet when each of these justifications is examined more closely,
neither appears sound enough to stand on its own.
51. Coryell v. Colbough, 1 N.J. 77 (1791).
52. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
53. See, e.g., Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (Wash. 1891) (declaring
that "the doctrine of punitive damages is unsound in principle, and unfair and dangerous in
practice" in civil cases).
54. See, e.g., id. at 1073-74 (arguing that the function of punishment is better left to the crimi-
nal courts).
55. See McFadden v. Tate, 85 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Mich. 1957) (stating where a defendant mali-
ciously inflicts an injury upon a victim the victim is entitled to compensation for the resulting
outrage, humiliation and indignity); Jackovich v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W.2d
458, 464 (Mich. App. 1982) (finding that the trial court's jury instruction, which explained that
punitive damages could be awarded solely to punish defendants, "misstated the Michigan law of
damages").
56. See Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972) ("No damages
are to be awarded as a punishment to the defendant or as a warning and example to deter him
and others from committing like offenses in the future. In other words, no damages other than
compensatory are to be awarded.").
57. See Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (Wash. 1977) (declining to allow punitive damages in
breach of promise to marry cases absent express statutory authorization); Spokane Truck &
Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (Wash. 1891) (precluding the recovery of punitive damages
in all civil personal injury actions).
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A. The Rationale of Punishment (and Deterrence)
1. Pretzel Logic
For starters, the phrase "punitive damages" is actually an oxymo-
ron. Punitive penalties concern only the wrongdoer; they seek to hurt
the culprit, or affect his behavior, and are assessed only in relation to
his misdeed. "Damage," however, applies exclusively to the victim. It
refers both to his loss or harm and the remedial measures that are
necessary to make him whole.
Once this oxymoron is understood, one can appreciate how truly
anomolous the concept of punitive damages actually is anomalous. If
punitive damages are designed to punish and deter conduct that is
socially undesirable regardless of its consequences, then why are they
not imposed as a criminal sanction at the instigation of the state which
typically protects the public interest? And if they are meant only as
penalties for bad behavior, and have no role in redressing actual losses
sustained by victims, then why should those otherwise compensated
for their injuries receive the windfall payment of this fine? Unable to
answer these questions, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire once
proclaimed that punitive damages are both a "monstrous heresy" and
"an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of the law."'58
2. Out of Place, Out of Time
Beyond this conceptual infirmity, the assumptions which at one
time may have necessitated punitive damages are no longer valid.
This is as true, in fact, for the more recent cases involving government
overreaching and corporate malfeasance as it is for the more tradi-
tional cases involving violent attacks and dishonorable behavior. With
the advent of modern criminal codes, more liberal social mores,
stricter checks upon government action and the age of business regu-
lation, there now appears to be little justification for maintaining a
cumbersome and costly system of civil penalties.
a. The ascendancy of criminal law
In colonial America, punitive damages were more than just a sup-
plemental remedy for civil litigants. They were one of the few avail-
able instruments of social control.59 Criminal justice systems from
58. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
59. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 179 (1989)
(stating that institutionalizing punishment operated as a form of social rehabilitation).
[Vol. 45:101
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New England to Georgia were crude at best and corrupt at worst.60
Although untrained constables and nightwatchmen recovered lost
children and provided shelter for the homeless, they attempted
neither to detect crime nor to deter it.61 In fact, police agencies, as we
have come to know them, simply did not exist.62 While chaos reigned
in the streets, ineptitude and avarice presided in the criminal courts.
Trials were informal and disorganized.63 Judges were unskilled or un-
scrupulous. 64 Indeed, in what is now Green Bay, Wisconsin, a justice
of the peace once granted a new trial to a losing party who offered
him a bottle of whisky.65 In that court, it was said, "a bottle of spirits
was the best witness that could be introduced." 66 The problem be-
came so bad in Virginia that, in one year, a third of that state's ac-
cused felons were discharged by county authorities; and of those who
were actually prosecuted, another third were acquitted.67 Because of
this sorry state of affairs, victims seeking justice during this period had
little choice but to sue their offenders (and hope for the best) or resort
to private acts of vengeance.
Since the eighteenth century, however, the mechanisms of the crim-
inal law have become this country's primary defense against antisocial
behavior. Today, highly specialized police agencies target criminals at
the federal, state and local levels. Knowledgeable judges bound by a
myriad of procedural and evidentiary constraints now try cases in hi-
tech courtrooms. Voluminous criminal codes, delineating a broad
spectrum of offenses and sanctions, have been adopted in every juris-
diction. Violent offenses, in particular, have been more expansively
catalogued and more vigorously prosecuted than ever before. Like-
wise, punishments for such offenses have been made more severe,
though perhaps less barbaric, than at any earlier time in our nation's
history. Given the enormity of these developments, any role which
punitive damages previously might have played in punishing or deter-
60. See id. at 177 (explaining that the colonial criminal justice systems suffered from these
deficiencies because they were deeply intertwined with local politics).
61. See id. 176-78, 184. For example, during the nineteenth century, police actually acted as
intermediaries between thieves and their victims, often arranging for victims to buy back their
stolen goods. Id. at 178.
62. To illustrate, the first urban police force, in Boston, was not created until 1838. Id. at 176.
63. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 140-41 (1973) (discussing
the prevalence of frontier justice in the territories of the northwest).
64. See id at 141 (noting that a corruptible justice of the peace, who could barely read or
write, provided the final word on justice).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. HALL, supra note 59, at 170.
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ring violent criminal wrongdoers now appears to be completely
obviated.
b. The decline of dishonor
While public concern about violent activity has increased over the
years, interest in dishonorable behavior clearly has faded. Many dis-
honorable acts which earlier attracted punitive sanctions - like se-
duction or breaching a promise of marriage - are not even tortious
today.68 Although defamation continues to be actionable, relief for
such conduct is severely limited and extremely difficult to obtain.69 In
contrast to early common law doctrine, which held defamers strictly
liable, today the Supreme Court precludes recovery unless the victim
can prove that the speaker acted maliciously. 70 The practical effect of
this requirement is to protect from exemplary damages those who dis-
honor others by the loose exercise of their First Amendment rights.
c. A new state of restraint
Another important objective of punitive damages - specifically,
combating abuses of government power - also seems largely anach-
ronistic today. Punitive damages were first formally recognized in the
eighteenth century English precedents of Wilkes v. Wood 7' and
Huckle v. Money.72 Both cases arose out of an occurrence which was
all too common at the time. Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, is-
sued baseless warrants to harass a printer and his employee who had
published material critical of King George .73 Although in each case
the plaintiff had suffered little actual injury, the court awarded "exem-
plary damages" to discourage government officials from engaging in
such tyrannical behavior in the future.74
68. Prosser notes the clear trend toward abolishing such claims. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,
PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 929-30 (5th ed. 1984).
69. See id. § 111, 771-72 (stating that the law of defamation "contains anomalies and absurdi-
ties .... it is a curious compound of strict liability imposed upon innocent defendants, as rigid
and extreme as anything found in the law, with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compen-
sate the plaintiff for real and serious harm").
70. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (concluding that
neither factual error nor content defamatory of official reputation (whether alone or in combina-
tion) provide a sufficient basis to warrant awarding punitive damages for false statements unless
"actual malice" is alleged and proved). By contrast, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), relaxed the burden of proof for plaintiffs who are private individuals rather than public
officials. See id. at 345-46 (explaining that "private individuals are... more vulnerable to injury
than public officials and are more deserving of recovery").
71. 95 Eng. Rep. 767, 767 (K.B. 1763).
72. 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768-69 (K.B. 1763).
73. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768; Wilkes, 95 Eng. Rep. at 767.
74. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769; Wilkes, 95 Eng. Rep. at 767.
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Using civil sanctions to harness state power was understandable in
eighteenth century England where corruption and tyranny were prev-
alent. In the United States, by contrast, there has never been a need
to invoke punitive damages as a bulwark against government oppres-
sion. Indeed, Americans have long enjoyed a plethora of public and
private law protections which both discourage and inhibit official
overreaching. For example, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution prohibit illegal searches and
seizures. 75 When these constitutional commands are violated, the fa-
miliar "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine excludes from criminal
trials any information acquired by the offending investigators. 76 In
addition, the rogue cops themselves may be personally punished for
their misdeeds. 77 As the Rodney King incident demonstrates, police
who abuse their authority now are almost certain to face criminal
prosecution.78 On top of this, such transgressors may be held individ-
ually liable under both federal and state law for infringing the civil
rights of their victims. 79
Though all of these protections are important, the threat of civil
liability alone provides enormous potential for deterrence. Consider-
ing that government officials typically earn modest salaries, and gener-
ally do not profit from their misdeeds, any sort of financial
accountability can be personally devastating. Indeed, for the over-
zealous public servant, an award of even compensatory damages may
not only end his career, it may force him into bankruptcy. If this pros-
75. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
76. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (citation and footnote omitted)
(concluding that statements made by defendant concurrent with his unlawful arrest constituted
fruits of the agents' unauthorized action, and thus should be excluded from evidence).
77. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecu-
tions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509 (1994) (detailing the state
and federal prosecutions against the police officers involved in the Rodney King beating).
78. See id. at 534 (reviewing the legal action taken against the officers involved in the Rodney
King incident).
79. For example, § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) is the federal
statute that is most often used to hold government officials liable for committing civil rights
violations. On the state level, many jurisdictions now recognize broad exemptions to sovereign
immunity under which victims may sue state officials for misconduct. See, e.g., Medeiros v.
Kondo, 522 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Haw. 1974) ("[I]f an official in exercising his authority is motivated
by malice, and not by an otherwise proper purpose, then he should not escape liability for the
injuries he causes."); Bone v. Andrus, 527 P.2d 783, 785 (Idaho 1974) (stating that sovereign
immunity protects the state, and not individual state officials, from tort actions) (citing Smith v.
State, 473 P.2d 937 (Idaho 1970)); Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (Md.
1971) ("[W]e cannot think of any reason why a public official should not be held responsible for
his malicious actions even though he claims they were done within the scope of his discretionary
authority.").
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pect is not enough to induce caution, it is difficult to see what further
deterrence punitive damages could provide.80
d. A more constrictive corporate climate
Whatever the public attitude towards big government, the plain fact
is that government was not the primary concern of most Americans
during the antebellum period. More feared and distrusted was the
rapidly emerging American corporation, especially the railroad com-
pany.8 ' Railroads enjoyed a privileged status during the nineteenth
century.82 Many companies were granted lucrative monopolies in des-
ignated geographic areas.83 States lavished corporate directors with
land and financial assistance. 84 In New York, the railroads so con-
trolled the commissioners appointed to regulate them that the com-
missioners successfully lobbied the legislature to abolish their own
offices.85 Even the common law was slanted noticeably in favor of
these soulless behemoths: trespassers were owed virtually no duty of
care;86 injured customers were routinely denied recovery because of
their own contributory negligence;8 7 employees victimized by co-
workers had no recourse against the company;88 and liability for track
fires was limited to the first adjoining landowner.8 9
80. In rejecting a separate monetary award for the technical infringement of a constitutional
right, the Supreme Court noted that "Section 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate
for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations." Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986).
81. See HALL, supra note 59, at 197-98 (discussing the laissez-faire attitude of legislators and
the public's response to such attitude).
82. See id. at 95-96 (detailing the promotional programs that states implemented to assist
railroads).
83. See id. at 97 (summarizing the monopoly privileges state legislators granted and their anti-
developmental consequences).
84. For a succinct discussion of the government's promotion of the railroad industry during
the nineteenth century see HALL, supra note 59, at 95, 96, 192, 197-98. See generally CARTER
GOODRICH, GovERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890
(1960) (discussing the government's support of railroads during the industrial revolution).
85. HALL, supra note 59, at 96.
86. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Saint Paul & Duluth Ry. Co., 76 F. 201, 205 (7th Cir. 1896) (holding
that the railroad owed no duty to a trespasser whose foot became caught between a rail track
and a cattle guard).
87. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 150 (1854) (holding the railroad
company not liable to a passenger for an accident which might have been prevented by the
passenger's ordinary attention to his own safety).
88. In particular, courts denied recovery under the now defunct "fellow-servant" rule. See,
e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 62 (dismissing a claim by
an engineer whose hand was injured after another employee improperly threw a switch).
89. See, e.g., Webb v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensberg R.R. Co., 49 N.Y. 420. 426 (1872)
(citing the well-established common law rule that "he who negligently manages a fire on his own
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Punitive damages provided one of the few checks upon the power
of these burgeoning giants. Railroad companies which remained un-
fettered by government regulation could nevertheless be hauled into
court and made to pay for compromising the safety of their passen-
gers.9° Here, at last, was a legitimate reason for imposing an extra-
compensatory, civil sanction. Punitive damages were the lone weapon
which small Davids might use to slay the huge Goliaths who
threatened to injure or exploit them.
With the battle against the railroads well under way, the weapon of
punitive damages soon was turned against a new group of titans. By
the turn of the century, product manufacturers, not railroads, became
the focal point of the punitive damage attack. This trend has contin-
ued throughout the twentieth century. Today, the primary use of pu-
nitive damages is to punish or deter those who make or sell "bad"
merchandise.91
One must wonder, however, whether modern merchants should be
treated the same as nineteenth century robber barons. Perhaps such
treatment would be appropriate if the legal, political and economic
conditions that existed a hundred years ago also existed today. The
problem is that they do not.
Unlike the railroad companies of yesteryear, which were actively
promoted by state government, contemporary product manufacturers
face a number of constraints upon their power and discretion. Anti-
trust laws now prohibit businesses from forming monopolies in order
to exploit their patrons or to gain an unfair economic advantage over
their competitors.92 Further, practically all product industries are reg-
ulated to some extent by both the state and federal governments.
Manufacturers of extremely dangerous products - like automobiles
and drugs - often are required by law to conduct specific tests, adopt
particular designs, or follow certain procedures. 93 Legal doctrines, as
property, is liable to his immediate neighbor for the damages caused to him by the spread of the
fire").
90. See, e.g., Trapnell v. Hines, 268 F. 504, 505-06 (3d Cir. 1920) (noting that railroads must
exercise reasonable care towards passengers under the circumstances).
91. See generally Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability: An Essay
in Oxymorons, 39 ViLL. L. REV. 505 (1994) (questioning the application of punitive damages to
products liability cases where there has been no showing of fault).
92. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) and the Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-17 & 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1994) comprise two of
the earliest and most influential monopoly-busting statutes.
93. For instance, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994) and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4 (1994), require auto manufacturers to establish internal
safety standards). Similarly, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393
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well, subject manufacturers to onerous performance standards. For
instance, the theories of strict liability,94 implied warranty, 95 and mar-
ket share liability96 all require manufacturers to make the best possi-
ble product or risk financial ruin. With so much control already being
exercised over the manufacturing industry, little in the way of con-
structive deterrence is likely to come from imposing further punitive
sanctions.
e. The end of one road; a bridge to another?
The lesson from all this is quite clear: despite whatever historical
circumstances may have once necessitated the use of punitive dam-
ages, the traditional goals of punishment and deterrence no longer
provide an adequate justification for awarding extra-compensatory re-
lief to civil claimants. Even so, this doctrinal collapse does not neces-
sarily condemn punitive damages to the legal scrap pile. It still
remains to be seen whether the imposition of such "excessive" dam-
ages may be supported by the alternative rationale of compensation.
B. The Rationale of Compensation
While perhaps it makes sense to compensate victims for intangible
injuries like embarrassment or mental distress, there is no need to des-
ignate a separate category of damages to serve this end. In contrast to
medieval England, which did not award money for mental anguish,
American courts today readily recognize psychic injuries as an accept-
(1994) requires pharmaceutical companies to include certain information on the label or packag-
ing of prescription drugs, including adequate directions for use, warnings concerning overdoses
and specific dangers to children, and a list of active ingredients, side effects, contraindications
and effectiveness.
94. The theory of strict products liability holds manufacturers accountable for product-related
injuries regardless of the degree of care that they have exercised in the preparation and sale of
their goods. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
95. For example, under § 2-314(2)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a product manufac-
turer may be held liable (despite his best efforts) if his merchandise turns out to be unfit for its
ordinary purpose.
96. The concept of market share liability provides that a plaintiff who is injured by a danger-
ous product may recover damages against one or more manufacturers of that product, even
though the plaintiff is unable to prove which manufacturer actually sold the product that caused
his injury. Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1342 (1987). Under the market
share liability theory, courts assess liability against manufacturers in proportion to their percent-
age of total sales for the offending product. Id. The named defendants then have the burden of
proving that they did not manufacture the product that injured the plaintiff. Id. See also Sindell
v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (holding that any
manufacturer of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) could be found liable for plaintiff's injuries
without proof of factual causation provided the plaintiff named as defendants a sufficient
number of DES manufacturers who controlled a substantial share of the market for the
product).
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able form of relief, both when they are accompanied by physical harm
and often when they are not.97
Purists might argue, however, that English courts were concerned
with more than just the psychological effects of intentional wrongdo-
ing; they were disturbed by the deeper dignitary injuries that may
have accompanied them. But even if one accepts the idea that digni-
tary harm is distinguishable from, and far more ethereal than, mere
pain and suffering - a position which I endorse - it is inconceivable
that any monetary remedy could ever repair such damage adequately.
1. The Peculiar Nature of Dignitary Harm
When a tortfeasor intentionally or maliciously inflicts harm upon
another - say, by violently raping her - he does more than merely
injure her body or destroy some of her personal property. He denies
her personhood. Every human being, because of his or her capacity to
reason, is imbued with an intrinsic worth that can never be compro-
mised or revoked. This worth, or dignity as it is sometimes called, is
the same for all people regardless of their race, ethnicity, gender or
social status. It entitles each individual to a certain degree of freedom
- specifically, the freedom to be let alone when so desired. As the
eighteenth century German philosopher Immanual Kant has ob-
served, this freedom requires that all human beings be treated as ends
in themselves, and not as a means to an end by anyone else.98
A wrongdoer who deliberately injures others repudiates this basic
moral precept. By committing the act of rape, the rapist uses his vic-
tim as an object to satisfy his perverse sexual or psychological desires
or predilections. This show of disrespect is more than just a trifling
lack of courtesy. It is an attempt by the wrongdoer both to assert his
intrinsic superiority and to dehumanize his victim.99
97. Plaintiffs typically bring such claims under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See, e.g., Saint Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (1987) (dispensing with
the requirement of proof of physical injury in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and allowing a hospital patient and her husband to recover for mental injuries suffered
after the hospital improperly disposed of their stillborn daughter's body). Other jurisdictions
have also rejected the physical manifestation requirement as a limitation on recovery for mental
anguish damages. Id. at 652 n.3 (citations omitted).
98. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 11 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
99. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Ooal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992) (stating that retribution is an attempt by courts to nullify
"the wrongdoer's message of superiority over the victim" by placing the victim in the position he
would have occupied had the wrongdoer not acted).
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2. Dollars Do Not Restore Dignity
The injury effected by such conduct, though intangible, is far more
grievous, and more difficult to redress, than any form of corporeal
harm. Because dignity is the cornerstone of self-respect, any dignitary
invasion is an assault upon the psyche of the victim.l00 Such damage
cannot be repaired with money forcibly disgorged from the wrong-
doer. Indeed, Kant notes that the dignity of a person has no price or
equivalent value for which it may be exchanged.' 0' Thus, no award of
monetary relief, whether in the form of compensatory or punitive
damages, can serve to properly rectify the moral imbalance created by
the wrongdoer. In fact, to allow a dehumanizer to pay for the privi-
lege of degrading another is to add insult to the underlying moral
injury.
IV. RESTORATIVE REMEDIES
When a wrong arises from an intensely personal, communicative act
of degradation - as is true in cases of intentional misconduct - it
can be reversed only by some gesture that both denies the culprit's
attempted superiority and reaffirms the victim's humanity. To make
such a gesture, the wrongdoer might acknowledge the victim's loss
and explain why he committed the offending act, offer a sincere public
apology, furnish community service, offer personal service to the vic-
tim over a specified period, create a scholarship or trust fund in the
victim's name, or perform any other act of submission that elevates
the victim's moral status.'0 2 Any or all of these remedies could be
implemented through voluntary mediation between the parties, or
100. Self-respect is a basic human need. It has two interrelated components: a sense of per-
sonal efficacy and a sense of self-worth. NATHANIEL BRANDEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF
ESTEEM 104 (1969). Both of these components are jeopardized by dehumanizing behavior. Self-
worth is determined largely by how we are treated by others. Those who are treated like dirt
eventually will regard themselves as dirt. Slaves, prison inmates and holocaust victims provide
ample proof of this fact. Personal efficacy, on the other hand, depends upon a person's own
ability to achieve his goals. To the extent that degrading behavior affects a victim's psyche,
altering both his attitudes and ambitions, it prevents him from implementing a virtuous life plan.
101. KANT, supra note 98, § 37.
102. See Hampton, supra note 99 at 1698 (arguing that the effect of a wrongdoer's apology to
a victim is to "annul[ I the appearance of degradation accomplished by [the] act, and establish[ ]
the right moral relationship between [the victim and the wrongdoer]"). In a recent study, 542
people were asked to suggest punishments for wrongdoers in a series of hypothetical transac-
tions. R. MuRRAY THOMAS & ANN DIVER-STAMNES, WHAT WRONGDOERS DESERVE 75 (1993).
The participants' recommendations included engaging in work that directly benefits the victim,
laboring for the victim's families, furnishing community service, offering a public apology, and
receiving public censure and humiliation. Id.
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through an appropriate equitable order enjoining the wrongdoer to
provide the required performance.
A. Defamation Means Sometimes Having to Say You're Sorry
Although such remedies are rare under the civil law, courts have
employed them in defamation cases for years. 103 Defamation is a dig-
nitary tort in which the victim's reputation, and thus his perceived
worth as a community member, is blemished or impaired. 1°4 Needless
to say, no amount of money can remove the black stain placed upon
the victim's name by a false statement. Accordingly, few defamation
plaintiffs file suit just to obtain compensatory or punitive damages.
Rather, these victims initiate litigation to clear their reputations by
demanding that the defendant retract his scurrilous remark and/or
provide a public apology. 10 5
B. Paradigm Shift in the Criminal Law
Curiously, this type of moral reparation has found greater accept-
ance within the criminal justice system than it has in the civil law.
What makes this unusual is that traditionally the criminal law has
been far more preoccupied with punishing or rehabilitating wrongdo-
ers than it has with placating victims, who often are treated as wit-
nesses and nothing more.
Within the last few decades, however, many jurisdictions have em-
braced the idea of "restorative justice" as a paradigm for handling
criminal matters. 10 6 Restorative justice views crime not just as a harm
to society but as the violation of one person by another.10 7 Thus,
under this model, the offender cannot undo his misdeed merely by
serving time in a jail cell. Rather, he must actively correct his wrong
by making amends directly to his victim.10 8
103. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REv. 789, 791 (1986) (reporting that "the major motivating factors [for
filing suit] are restoring reputation, correcting ... falsity, and vengeance").
104. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990).
105. See Bezanson, supra note 103, at 800 (noting the Iowa Libel Research Survey's finding
that eighty-three percent of those who instituted litigation expressed an interest in non-litigation
alternatives).
106. See Ellen Joan Pollack, Victim-Perpetrator Reconciliations Grow in Popularity, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 28, 1993, at B1 (relating that the popularity of victim-offender reconciliation has lead to
the development of over 125 restorative justice programs throughout the United States).
107. For a general account of the philosophy and objectives of the restorative paradigm see
Mark S. Umbreit, Holding Justice Offenders Accountable: A Restorative Justice Perspective, Juv.
& FAM. Cr. J., Spring 1995, at 31-42.
108. Id.
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This healing process is both promoted and facilitated by victim-of-
fender mediation.109 Victim-offender mediation offers an aggrieved
party the opportunity to confront his wrongdoer in a controlled set-
ting.110 These meetings, which may occur either before or after a
criminal trial and are always voluntary, typically unfold in two stages.
In the first, the victim is allowed to ask questions - like "why did you
do this to me?" - and to describe how the crime has affected his
life."' The offender, on the other hand, may respond to the victim's
inquiries, ask questions of his own, or offer an apology. 1 2 In the sec-
ond stage, the parties negotiate and sign a restitution agreement which
compensates the victim for his loss. 113 Besides requiring the offender
to make financial reparation, such agreements frequently direct him
to perform service for the victim or the community."14
Early studies show these mediation programs to be highly success-
ful." 5 For example, at Minneapolis' Center for Victim Offender Me-
diation, eighty-six percent of victims in the program said meeting their
offenders was helpful, while ninety-five percent of the offenders felt
better after the mediation."16 Interestingly, most of the victims - a
staggering ninety-two percent - felt that meeting the offender, talk-
ing about the crime, expressing their grief and receiving an apology
were more important than obtaining monetary compensation." 7
C. Time for a Change
Given this experience, there is no reason to doubt that such reme-
dies would be equally effective in a civil context. In fact, the civil jus-
tice system seems to be a more appropriate forum for this type of
restorative paradigm. After all, the civil lawsuit traditionally has been
used as the primary means for resolving serious interpersonal dis-
putes. If we are to maintain our current bifurcated system of justice
- with one branch of the system, the criminal law, addressing public
offenses and the other branch, the civil law, correcting private wrongs
109. See generally Mark S. Umbreit, Crime Victims and Offenders in Mediation: An Emerging
Area of Social Work Practice, 38 Soc. WORK 69-73 (1993).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Mark S. Umbreit, Minnesota Mediation Center Produces Positive Results, CoRREc-
TIONs TODAY, Aug. 1991, at 195 (explaining that "88 percent of [the] victims [surveyed in the
Center for Victim Offender Mediation program] were concerned about offenders' needs for
counseling and other rehabilitative services").
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 194-95.
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- then restorative remedies clearly fit more comfortably into the lat-
ter category.
In any event, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that civil litigants
are eager to accept these more personal, restorative solutions to their
transactional conflicts. In California, for example, a basketball fan
who was allegedly assaulted and defamed by a coach declared his will-
ingness to discontinue legal action against him if the coach would
merely apologize for the incident.118 Similarly, in Canada, thousands
of orphans who supposedly had been abused by several nuns filed a
$1.2 billion lawsuit against the Catholic Church for no other reason
than the get "someone to say they were sorry." 1 9 Likewise, in the
O.J. Simpson affair, the family of murder victim Ronald Goldman in-
stituted a wrongful death action against Mr. Simpson which, according
to Kimberly Goldman (Ronald's sister), "doesn't have anything to do
with money.' 120 Its true purpose, she explained, is to make Simpson
feel at least some measure of the pain presently being endured by her
family.12' Most recently, one of several plaintiffs who recovered a
$15.9 million "excessive force" judgment against the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, the largest such verdict in the county's
history, remarked that "the money is nothing" and that it could never
end the nightmares still haunting the victims. 122 Looking forward to
the punitive phase of the trial, the plaintiffs' attorney noted that his
clients would be happy receiving nothing more than $1 and a written
apology from each of the offending deputies. 123
D. Critic's Comer
Skeptics may question the sincerity of these proclamations. After
all, in each case, the plaintiff or plaintiffs have invoked the legal pro-
cess and have made a request for compensatory and/or punitive dam-
ages. Without a claim for punitive relief, it is quite possible that these
actions would never have been initiated. Indeed, in cases where the
monetary loss of the victim is minimal, a lawyer who accepts a contin-
gency fee will receive little for his efforts unless he is able to win a
118. Mike Hiserman, Northridge Staff Member Serves Notice, Asks Boseman to Apologize,
L.A. Timrs, Feb. 25, 1995, at C7.
119. Anne Swardson, Quebec "Orphans" Charging Abuses; Thousands Declared Retarded By
Nuns in Postwar Asylums, WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1993, at Al.
120. Goldman Family Suing Simpson, BuFF. NEWS, May 6, 1995, at A5. The Goldmans' com-
plaint requests funeral expenses and an unspecified amount of punitive damages.
121. Specifically, Kimberly Goldman opined that, "if we can make [O.J. Simpson] feel a quar-
ter of the pain we feel, it's worth it." Id.
122. Bettina Boxall, Despite Vindication, Pain Lingers, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at B1.
123. Id. at B2.
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substantial award of punitive damages. If this payoff were eliminated,
many attorneys would be discouraged from taking cases involving the
most serious forms of misconduct; and if this occurred, the skeptics
warn, many a deliberate wrongdoer would avoid having to pay any
legal penalty.
As unsettling as these contingencies may be, they do not justify re-
taining the civil remedy of punitive damages. Even if one were to
accept the notion that the civil law should be used in conjunction with
the criminal law to prosecute law-breakers - a position which now
appears outdated - punitive damages are not necessary for this pur-
pose. The reason is that an intentional wrongdoer already may be
made to pay more than merely compensatory damages; he may be
required to pay the victim's attorney's fees as well.' 24 Such a remedy,
in fact, serves dual objectives. Besides imposing an extra deterrent
sanction on the offender, it gives ample incentive to victims and their
attorneys to see that serious wrongs do not go uncorrected.
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, any drawbacks to eliminating punitive damages would
be far outweighed by the advantages of adopting the types of per-
sonal, restorative remedies mentioned in this Essay. The savings to
the judicial system alone would be enormous. Trials could be short-
ened and needless motions and appeals obviated. In addition, courts
no longer would have to justify the lottery-like windfall that punitive
damages provide to the luckiest or greediest plaintiffs. The market-
place would benefit as well. Providers of valuable products and serv-
ices could pursue new technologies without fear of paralyzing or even
fatal liabilities. Consumers, in turn, could buy products at affordable
prices without paying the hidden tort tax that now accompanies most
goods.
But the biggest plus of all would be the new sense of satisfaction
that victims of malicious wrongdoing would receive from the civil jus-
tice system. By replacing punitive damages with more humanistic
remedies like mediation or equitable intervention, those who suffer
the horror and degradation of such conduct will at last be able to get
what they really seek - not a financial bonanza, but a bit of respect, a
touch of compassion, a glimmer of understanding, a degree of control
and a liberating sense of closure.
124. See Dobbs, supra note 14, at 888.94 (concluding that intentional wrongdoers who are
required to shoulder plaintiff's litigation costs would be adequately deterred from repeating the
offending behavior).
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